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Abstract: What are the determinants of economic reform efforts? This paper tries to throw 
light on this question by examining recent reforms in Brazil, a country which followed a 
gradualist approach and was a late-starter among Latin American economies. We argue that 
these first generation reforms (trade liberalization, stabilization, privatization and the adoption 
of a new macro-policy framework) were driven by the drastic growth slowdown and re-
democratization of the 1980s.  We argue that their gradual and democratic implementation not 
only respond for their sustainability but also shows that the country is ready for a second 
generation of reforms focusing explicitly on institutional deficiencies.   
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The last two decades witnessed profound changes in economic policy as well as radical 
institutional transformation around the world. In the 1980s, the drive away from heavy 
government intervention in the economy towards arrangements based more on the market 
mechanism started to take off in most Latin American and East Asian countries. These 
changes become even more radical with the collapse of socialism (in the late 1980s) and the 
subsequent process of transition towards a market economy in the 1990s that took place in the 
Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. One of the major lessons from the last 
two decades is that the success of economic reforms does not rest solely on changes in 
economic policies (that is, on the adoption of “good policies” as prescribed in the Washington 
consensus). It goes beyond: successful economic reforms need to be carried out in a 
supportive institutional framework. Thus one of the most pressing questions for economists 
today is, therefore, what are the determinants of economic reform efforts?   
This paper tries to throw light on this question by examining recent economic reform 
in Brazil, a country which followed a gradualist approach and was a late-starter among Latin 
American economies. The reforms we focus on are basically the adoption of a new 
macroeconomic policy framework and market-friendly reforms in the 1990s. We argue that 
this new policy regime have laid solid foundations for the resumption of economic growth. 
Although the country’s ability to consolidate and deepen its commitment to reform and to 
carry out needed institutional changes are key issues remaining, our outlook is optimistic. 
The literature on economic reform and economic performance is large and rapidly 
growing. One recent paper that is close to ours in spirit is Card and Freeman (2002) account 
of the effects of two decades of reform in the United Kingdom on economic performance. Our 
paper is also closely related to the large literature on economic reform in Latin America, from 
which we highlight the contributions by Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997), Fernandez-Aria 
and Montiel (1997) and Lora (2001). Finally, our paper is also motivated by the literature on 
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economic growth and institutions, for instance, the work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) and, focused on the Latin American experience, Campos and Nugent (1998, 1999).   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the growth performance of the 
Brazilian economy in comparative perspective. Section 3 discusses economic reform in Brazil 
in the last two decades, with emphasis on the structural reforms of the 1990s as well as the 
Real Plan (1994). Section 4 highlights the changes in the policy regime that occurred in the 
late 1990s, with the currency devaluation and the adoption of inflation targets and rigid fiscal 
discipline. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main challenges that may lie ahead.   
  
2. Growth and reform 
The objective of this section is to discuss the growth performance of the Brazilian economy 
over the long term in comparative perspective. The poor performance of the Brazilian 
economy in the years between 1980 and 2000 is at odds with the country’s growth record in 
the rest of the twentieth century. Indeed, for several decades Brazil was one of the fastest 
growing economies not only in Latin America, but in the world as well.   
As Figure 1 shows, the growth of Brazilian per capita GDP has been remarkable in the 
first three quarters of the last century. These rates are consistently high for the first half of the 
century (Brazil is the only country to have grown consistently at above 2 percent) and this 
well differentiated performance accentuates in the third quarter, culminating with the 
“Brazilian Miracle.” In this light, the 1980s and the 1990s are all the more disappointing 
(although only Chile shows consistently positive growth rates for these latter two decades).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
 
How impressive was this growth performance in global terms, that is, if we also take 
into account non-Latin American countries?  Even including the 1980s and 1990s, the growth 
of Brazilian per capita GDP in the last century is among the five fastest in the world. Japan 
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and South Korea have grown at higher average rates, but Spain, Chile and Mexico have 
clearly not.  
 In the period 1950-80, annual growth fell below the 4% mark in only four years. In 
contrast, during the 1980s per capita income fell by an average 0.5% per year, growing a mere 
1.1% during the 1990s, netting just 0.3% per year over these two decades.  
It is also clear that the performance in the 1980s is strikingly different. Such a 
contrasting performance is due to a constellation of factors. The 1980s are a direct result of 
the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, of the 1982 debt crisis and of the evidence of the limit of the 
import substitution development strategy. However, it is important to mention that re-
democratization also marks the 1980s with consequences in terms of the formulation and 
conduction of economic policy that are still largely unknown.  
Persistent inflation followed (Figure 2) as well as a sequence of unsuccessful 
stabilization plans (in 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990 and 1991). In annual figures, inflation 
progresses from about 100% in 1980 to 200% in 1983 to 500% in 1987 to 1500% in 1989. In 
the 12 months preceding the Real plan the rate reached 5,150%. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 About Here] 
 
Despite the similar performance in terms of GDP growth, the 1980s (known as the 
“lost decade”) and the 1990s differ in at least three important aspects. First, while the 1980s 
were a period of high inflation and failed stabilization plans, the 1990swere marked by the 
fruits of a successful stabilization program. Second, whereas the 1980s saw high and often 
rising levels of state intervention, the 1990s can be characterized as the “decade of market-
oriented reforms”. Third, and largely as a consequence of the first two, while the 1980s ended 
with a feeling of hopelessness, without a clear consensual diagnosis of the crisis and with the 
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country close to hyperinflation, at the end of the 1990s there were signs of a return to a 
trajectory of sustained growth.  
 Growth accounting results are also useful in highlighting these differences. As it can 
be seen from Table 1, the most striking difference is not related to the accumulation of capital 
or labor, but to a major increase in the contribution of productivity. As the later is calculated 
in a standard way (as a residual), we interpret this change as deeply associated with the major 
reform efforts that took place in the 1990s. In the next sessions, we try to open up this “black 
box” by taking a closer look at the major components of the reform effort before turning to 
their potential relationship with the resumption of sustainable economic growth in Brazil.  
 
 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
3. Major economic reforms in the 1990s  
A full assessment of the radical transformations that occurred Brazil in the 1990s, and indeed 
a proper understanding of why the Real has succeeded where previous stabilization attempts 
failed, have to take into account the supply-side reforms carried out in that period. These 
reforms comprised a number of initiatives aimed at raising productivity through reduced 
regulatory intervention and increased competition in the economy, mainly trade liberalization, 
privatization and deregulation.   
 
3.1. Trade Liberalization  
In order to gauge the importance of trade liberalization in the 1990s note that over the 
previous two decades Brazil had become one of the most closed economies in the world. The 
strategy of import substitution was taken to extremes. One indication is that the imports’ share 
of domestic consumption of manufactured goods reached 4.8% in 1989 (Moreira and Correia, 
1998). These policies were unsustainable and as the foreign exchange constraint lessened in 
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the late 1980s, Brazil gradually moved towards a more open and neutral trade policy. 
In 1988-93 the degree of protection to domestic producers was greatly reduced. Two 
major reforms, in 1988 and 1989, brought the average tariff on imports down from 51 to 35 
percent. Most non-tariff barriers were eliminated in 1990, with the ban on imports of 
computer products ending in October 1992. In addition, a pre-announced schedule of tariff 
reductions brought the average nominal import tariff down from 32.2% (with a 19.6% 
dispersion) in 1990 to 14.9% (with an 8.2% dispersion) in the second semester of 1993. Trade 
liberalization was particularly significant for consumer goods: tariffs for durable consumer 
goods declined by 66 percentage points, while elimination of the negative import list gave 
domestic consumers legal access to foreign goods that had in practice been banned for 
decades.  
With respect to exports, trade policy has also become more neutral since the mid-
1980s and especially after 1990. Several subsidies were discontinued in 1983-85. As the 
Collor government took office (in March 1990) export subsidies were eliminated and tax 
incentives reduced (Sucupira and Moreira, 2001). 
A crucial development in terms of trade policy for Brazil was the establishment in 
1991 of Mercosur, the regional trade agreement initially comprising Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. Mercosur has been fulcral in attracting FDI to Brazil, which has 
helped make the country a regional export base for many multinational corporations (Pinheiro 
and Moreira, 2000). Overall, Brazilian exports to its Mercosur partners increased 235% from 
1991 to 2000, while imports increased 244%.  
The impact of trade liberalization has been dramatic regarding both the degree of trade 
and investment integration into the world economy, and the extent to which it has contributed 
to encourage technological modernization (Moreira and Correia, 1998, and McKinsey, 1998). 
Non-oil imports increased from US$ 11.0 billion in 1987 to US$ 44.3 billion in 1995, 
reaching US$ 49.4 billion by 2000. Imports of consumer and capital goods, in particular, 
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expanded substantially in the 1990s. Stiffer competition and easier access to foreign 
intermediate and capital inputs have stimulated domestic producers to improve their 
competitiveness (Muendler, 2001). 
Yet export performance tarnished what would otherwise be a remarkable response to 
trade liberalization. Exports were slow to respond. After signs of a strong recovery in 1992-
94, export growth moved into a downward trend, reversed for only a brief period in 1997.1  
The appreciation of the exchange rate seems to have played a large role in this slow 
response. Contrary to expectations (see, e.g. Papageorgiu, Michaely and Choski, 1991), trade 
liberalization in Brazil’s was not followed by a real exchange rate devaluation. Currency 
appreciation was only broken in January 1999, when the slowdown in international markets 
and the Russian default, pushed the government to float the exchange rate, a decision which 
produced a major devaluation (see below). This change in relative prices did not take long to 
show its impacts.   
[Insert Chart 1 About Here] 
 
Apart from an exchange rate appreciation, exports also suffered from the lack of 
investment in infrastructure a consequence of the public finance crises of the 1980s and from 
an inefficient tax system. In the former, considerable progress was made in the second half of 
the nineties through privatization of the state enterprises (see next section). The tax system, 
though, has yet to be reformed. 
 
3.2. Privatization 
Although Brazilian privatization started out in the 1980s, it was only in the following decade 
that it actually gained momentum.2 In March 1990, the Collor Government launched the 
                                                           
 
1 See Pinheiro e Moreira (2000). 
 
2 Brazilian privatization during the Collor administration is discussed in Pinheiro and 
Giambiagi (1994). For a Latin American perspective, see also Baer (1994). 
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“National Privatization Program,” expanding the Program to include the larger (and oldest) 
state enterprises. In September 1992, President Collor was impeached and replaced by Vice-
President Franco, who continued the privatization process at its previous pace. Together, the 
two administrations sold 33 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with results amounting to US$ 
11.9 billion, including both proceeds and debt transfers. Particularly important in that period 
was the divestiture of the steel sector, which had been developed after World War II under 
public guidance and that until the eighties was perceived as critical for national security.  
Brazilian privatization reached its peak during President Cardoso´s first term (1995-
98), when 80 companies were sold, generating US$ 73.3 billion in total revenues (Table 3). 
Two related developments allowed such a substantial expansion in the size and scope of 
privatization. One was the engagement of state (province) governments in the privatization 
effort, leading to the sale for instance of several electricity distribution companies. A second 
development was the decision to amend the constitution to discontinue public monopolies and 
end discrimination against subsidiaries of foreign companies. This constitutional change 
allowed to extend the privatization efforts to telecommunications, electricity and mining (the 
Brazilian largest SOEs were all in these sectors). During this period, other important sectors 
such as railways and ports, were also partly or totally transferred to the private sector.3   6  
The widened privatization played an important role in sustaining the Real Plan, 
especially in Cardoso´s first term (Pinheiro and Giambiagi, 2000). With the sales of 1997-98 
Brazil attracted large volumes of foreign direct investment, which helped to finance the high 
current account deficit (in 1997-2000, the ratio between FDI inflows associated with 
privatization and the current account deficit averaged almost 25%). Privatization was also 
instrumental in averting an explosion in public debt, despite a fiscal deficit growing since 
                                                           
  
 
3 See the papers in Pinheiro and Fukasaku (2000) for further discussion on privatization 
during President Cardoso´s first administration.  
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1995. Carvalho (2001) shows that the use of privatization proceeds decreased the public debt 
and resulted in the latter being, in December 1999, 8.4% of GDP lower than what it would 
have been in the absence of privatization.  
More important in the long run, however, is the significant change that privatization 
brought to the way former state owned enterprises are managed. Under private control, these 
companies became more customer oriented, technologically updated, and equipped with 
better information systems and human resource management, with fewer but in general better 
motivated employees. The impact of these changes as well as of greater access to capital on 
output, productivity and investment has been positive.4 Becoming more efficient and adopting 
better commercial practices these firms were able to greatly increase their profitability, raise 
their creditworthiness, and in turn facilitating the financing of new investments. The results 
have been impressive in both industry and infrastructure, in which all sectors registered the 
rehabilitation of physical networks and increases in productivity, even when these gains have 
been more pronounced in some sectors than in others. One of the greatest successes is 
telecommunications. The density of fixed lines more than doubled after privatization, 
reaching 20.2 fixed lines (against 9.6 in 1996) and 15.0 cellular phones per 100 inhabitants 
(against 1.6 in 1996) in 2001. In manufacturing, privatization has also been successful. In 
infrastructure, however, privatization is just a step in the regulatory reform process, which 
will not be complete until sound regulation is in place and well-functioning regulatory 
agencies are fully operational. In this sense, in infrastructure it is necessary to go beyond 
reductions in technical losses, better management, and rehabilitation of existing facilities, and 
be able to foster a large expansion in output capacity and to translate productivity gains into 
lower prices to consumers. And in these areas the degree of success of the new regulatory 
framework is relatively heterogeneous across sectors, reflecting the varying quality of sector 
                                                           
 




[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
  
For various reasons, the privatization process decelerated to almost a complete halt in 
President Cardoso’s second term (1999-2002). One was the decline in popular support for 
privatization. Another reason was a consequence of changes in the fiscal regime and a large 
inflow of non-privatization related FDI and the rising technical and political complexity of 
privatizing the remaining SOEs. This the state remains the owner of sizable assets in sectors 
such as oil, electricity, water and sanitation sectors and is likely to remain so until increases in 
the quality of sector regulation.   
 
 
3.3 Stabilization  
Unveiled in 1994, the Real Plan can be seen as the logical macroeconomic counterpart to the 
market-oriented reforms carried out in the 1990s, both in the sense of magnifying their impact 
on growth and of generating the political conditions to pursue them.5 The plan was successful. 
It should be mentioned is worth noting that in 1986-91 there were five stabilization plans, 
based on price freezes or variants, all of which failed.6 The difference in the case of the Real 
Plan was a virtual currency, known as the Real Unit of Value (URV), pegged to the dollar. 
The government set a period of 4 months for economic agents to adjust to this new unit. 
During this period, not only the exchange rate, but also some basic prices such as public-
sector salaries, pensions, the minimum wage and tariffs charged by public utilities were 
                                                           
 
  
5  See Pinheiro and Giambiagi (2000) for an analysis of this bi-directional relationship in the 
case of privatization. 
 
6  For an overview of the history of Brazilian inflation see Tullio and Ronci (1996). 
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compulsorily converted into URVs. At the end of this 4-month period (on June 30, 1994), 
during which inflation in the old currency reached almost 50% a month, the URV was 
converted into the new currency, the real. The entire monetary base in the old currency was 
then physically replaced in just a few days.   
In the years following the Real Plan, the economy’s performance was mixed. The Plan 
was very successful in reducing inflation: in the 12 months preceding the Plan, accumulated 
inflation was 5,154% (by the IGP). After the launching of the Plan, 12-month cumulative 
inflation fell almost continuously and ended 1998 at 1.7%.     
As noted, one of the drawbacks was that Brazil has had since 1995 large fiscal and 
current account deficits, which over time led to mounting public and external liabilities, 
compounding the original disequilibria. In the case of the fiscal accounts, the primary 
consolidated result for the public sector, which excludes interest payments, fell from an 
average surplus of 2.9% of GDP in 1991-94, to an average deficit of 0.2% of GDP in 1995-
98.   
Until 1994, it was relatively easy to control real public sector expenditures with the 
aid of price increases, by delaying actual spending. Inflation facilitated management of intra-
government political disputes for resources. With the fall in inflation, the “political price of 
saying no” became explicit and, in practice, the greater difficulty of opposing external and 
internal demands for funds also helped to boost the real level of public expenditure. In 
addition to the fall in inflation, the deterioration in the fiscal accounts was associated to a 
more expansionist fiscal policy and to structural flaws in the public sector finances.  
The rise in the current account deficit, in turn, was the result of demand enhancing and 
demand switching effects of the Real Plan. Aggregate demand went up as a result of higher 
real public spending and booms in private investment and consumption. Further, the 
government was interested in using the exchange rate as an anchor in the stabilization plan 
and the effects of these high interest rates attracting foreign capital preceded a substantial 
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appreciation of the exchange rate. Between June 1994 and February 1995, the real exchange 
rate appreciated by 30% (Figure 4).7  
 
[Insert Figure 4 About Here] 
   
 The appreciation of the real and increases in aggregate demand caused an inversion in 
the trade balance, which shifted from an US$ 11 billion surplus in 1994 to a US$ 3 billion 
deficit in 1995. The deterioration of the trade balance was compounded by an increase in 
interest and dividend payments (that more than doubled between 1994 and 1998), leading to 
rather high current account deficits (4% of GDP in 1997). The risks of these mounting 
imbalances did not go unnoticed.8 Yet the government believed that the prevailing situation in 
international capital markets - marked by high liquidity and wide access to capital by 
emerging economies – made possible a strategy of gradual adjustment. 
The worsening of the current account and the fact that a large part of its deficit was 
financed by short-term capital flows made the economy more dependent on external financing 
and, consequently, more vulnerable to external shocks. This rise in vulnerability was 
prompted by the Mexican crisis in March 1995, reaffirmed by the Asian crisis in October 
1997 and made unbearable by the Russian default in 1998. Brazil’s tribulations in late 1998 
and early 1999 resulted not only from structural imbalances -- the traditional Latin American 
fiscal and external predicaments -- but also from the policy regime’s lack of credibility.  
It became clear with the Asian crisis that adjustments were necessary, forcing the 
government to gradually change course in two ways: first, through the nominal devaluation of 
the real (around 8% per year), in an environment in which domestic inflation was very close 
                                                           
 
7 The figure presents the real R$/US$ exchange rate, with CPI representing the US consumer 
price index, and IPCA, the Brazilian consumer price index. The appreciation of the R$ - 
which was initially set equal to US$ 1 – was more than 15% in the first months of the Real 
Plan. To this must be added a not insignificant residual inflation.  
  
8 See, inter alia, Goldfajn and Valdés (1996) and Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997). For a defense 
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to international levels, leading to an annual real devaluation of approximately 6% in 1998; 
and second, by improving the primary result of the consolidated public sector by 1% of GDP 
relative to 1997. Despite the significance of these measures, they were insufficient to reduce 
the magnitude sufficiently of the macroeconomic imbalances. 
In this environment, the burden of monetary policy in sustaining exchange rate 
stability increased with annualized interest rates rising above 40% in October 1998, 
negatively affecting output and the public accounts. That this policy framework was 
unsustainable was now clear.9 Between the first days of August and the end of September 
1998, Brazil lost US$ 30 billion in international reserves. The announcement in October that 
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was under consideration brought 
some respite.  Yet the rejection by the National Congress of an important fiscal adjustment 
measure and the announcement of a moratorium on federal debt by the State of Minas Gerais 
precipitated events. Between the end of December 1998 and the first days of 1999 Brazil lost 
between US$ 500 million and US$ 1 billion a day in reserves. On January 15, after rejecting 
suggestions of “Malaysian-style” capital controls, the authorities let exchange rate float. 
The currency crisis can indeed be seen as the final act of the first Cardoso 
administration. For all its problems, this administration was instrumental in deepening and 
consolidating the market oriented reforms initiated in the early 1990s. The privatization of 
public utilities, increases in productivity, the strengthening of the financial system and, above 
all, the control of a runaway inflation are gains whose importance can hardly be 
overestimated. Yet, the failure to move quickly in solving the country’s main macroeconomic 
imbalances left major obstacles in the road to recovery. The fiscal reforms of late 1998 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
of the exchange rate policy of that time, see Franco (1999).  
 
9  Therefore, they combined elements of the two types of currency crises described by 
Krugman (1998), associated with the so-called models of first and second generation. As 
argued by Drazen and Masson (1994), there comes a time when commitment to “even more 
austere” policies becomes ineffective. 
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early 1999 and the January 1999 devaluation were the first steps towards overcoming these 
hurdles. 
 
4. Reform as the century turns   
The immediate aftermath of the Brazilian currency crisis was not surprising: substantial 
overshooting in the devaluation in the first months of the crisis, which did not last more than a 
year. Yet, while in Mexico the overshooting was eliminated via inflation, in South Korea the 
adjustment occurred mainly through a nominal appreciation, with a very limited role for 
inflation. In Brazil, there were fears that the appreciation of the real would follow Mexico’s 
footsteps, given the country’s inflationary record, explaining the reluctance to let the 
exchange rate float in the first place. In practice, adjustment was similar to that of South 
Korea. The R$/US$ exchange rate that stood at R$1.21 before the devaluation, peaked at R$ 
2.16 at the height of the crisis, before ending 1999 at R$ 1.79. The nominal devaluation 
amounted to 48%, against a consumer inflation of 9%, i.e. a pass through of less than 20%. 
The fact that the devaluation coincided with slow growth explains partly why inflation 
did not explode, as widely feared.10 There were also other important factors: a) the 
management of monetary policy, with an accurate and timely “fine tuning” of interest rates; b) 
the renegotiation of the IMF agreement, which signaled to a credible fiscal adjustment and 
provided room for the Central Bank to intervene in the currency market; c) the announcement 
of moderate increases in the minimum wage; and d) the decision to adopt an inflation target 
regime. 
The limited impact on inflation and the sound balance sheets of financial institutions 
help explain why devaluation did not lead to a drastic recession as in Mexico and South 
                                                           
  
10 In December 1998, seasonally adjusted monthly industrial production was 10% below its 
historic peak reached at the end of 1994, and 7% below the near-term maximum of mid-1998. 
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Korea.11 With close to 50% nominal devaluation, a 10% consumer inflation and a modest 
expansion in GDP, driven by an improvement in the trade balance, Brazil carried out a 
relatively successful transition in exchange rate regimes.12 
Underlying this process were important changes in the economic policy regime, 
which, by effectively dealing with the inherited macroeconomic imbalances paved the way for 
a new cycle of sustainable growth. Among them stand out: the adoption of a floating 
exchange rate regime, replacing the quasi-fixed regime in place until 1998, and the 
implementation of fiscal and inflation targets. 
The new exchange rate regime gave monetary policy greater room for maneuver. It 
also enhanced the flexibility of the price mechanism to adjust to the structural changes that 
Brazil has been going through since the beginning of the nineties. The potential cost was the 
risk of increasing exchange rate volatility.  
The adoption of fiscal targets under the umbrella of the IMF agreement  led Brazil to 
adopt fiscal rules (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995). Brazil has moved, then, from a situation 
in which the fiscal deficit was the variable which would square the mismatch between the 
society demands for public goods and its willingness to accept taxation, to a scenario where a 
rigid fiscal target is established and the adjustment falls on revenues or expenditures. 
A host of extraordinary measures, such as temporary taxes or proceeds from the sale 
                                                           
  
11 On the relatively sound situation of Brazil’s financial sector, see Standard & Poors – S&P 
(1999). The external crisis of 1999 found the Brazilian financial system relatively well 
adjusted to the parameters established by the Basle Accord. Moreover, Banks were well 
prepared for the prospect of devaluation, especially after the Asian crisis of 1997. To a certain 
extent, Brazil benefited from the fact that the Mexican and Asian crises had already happened, 
since this gave the banks considerable time to prepare for a possible crisis.  
   
12  The change in the trade balance was much less impressive than in the case of Mexico and 
South Korea, in the absence of a large contraction in GDP, as in Mexico and Korea. 
Moreover, Brazil experienced a sharp deterioration in its terms of trade in 1999, with a 13% 
fall in the average price of exports. Despite this, in volume terms, exports of goods grew by 
9%, while imports fell by 15%, compensating the moderate falls in investment, public-sector 
spending and consumption, and causing GDP to grow 0.8%. 
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of state-owned enterprises, allowed revenues to rise as a percentage of GDP, despite the low 
growth and high unemployment (Appendix). This led to a consolidated primary surplus for 
the public sector of almost 4% of GDP, in sharp contrast to the situation in previous years.13    
The adjustment also benefited from a series of important fiscal reforms, such as: a) 
establishment of needed restrictions on retirement in the public sector; b) approval of a new 
formula for calculating pension benefits; c) renegotiation of state debts against collateral 
associated with federal government transfers to states, providing the former with the legal 
instruments to enforce the negotiated terms (this implied a need for all levels of government 
to make their own adjustments, since they will no longer be able to count on treasury 
bailouts); d) approval of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, inspired by similar legislation in New 
Zealand, which establishes parameters of behavior for the various levels of government, and 
defines ceilings for spending on payrolls for the various parts of the public sector; e)  
privatization of several local state (province) banks; and f)  privatization of the majority of 
companies owned by state (province) governments. 
Finally, the adoption of inflation targeting meant a fundamental change in policy 
making in Brazil. 22 The targets set were strict, since they were fixed more than 2 years in 
advance, with no room for mid-term adjustments. The targets set for 1999-2002, using the 
IPC as a benchmark, were, respectively 8%, 6% and 4%, 3.5% with a 2 percentage points 
margin of error on either side in all cases. The system worked very well in the first two years 
but a succession of external shocks left actual inflation out of those boundaries. Still the 
important medium term objective in terms of expectations was fulfilled.    
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
  
13  When the December 1998 agreement with the IMF was renegotiated after the devaluation, 
the level of future inflation and the consequent level of interest rates and the nominal deficit 
for 1999 were still highly uncertain. As a consequence, the agreement was signed taking the 
performance criterion as the floor value for the primary deficit, instead as the ceiling for the 
nominal deficit, as usual in IMF programs.  
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After a promising start, the economy began to face major difficulties both domestically 
and abroad. First came the deepening of Argentina’s recession and the sharp downturn of the 
US economy, which reduced capital flows to Latin America and curtailed the market for 
Brazil’s exports. Second the energy crisis in the second quarter of 2001. The worst draught in 
the last seventy years (hydroelectricity accounts in average for 90% of Brazil’s power 
supply), coupled by regulatory shortcomings and low investment, forced the government to 
ration electricity to avert energy blackouts. Last, in third quarter, came the terrorist attacks in 
the United States, which thrown the world economy, and particularly the emerging markets, 
in disarray, delivering yet another blow to the already bleak prospects of capital flows to and 
exports from developing countries. 2002 brought, in addition to electoral uncertainty, the two 
sides of the Argentinean contagion (first, financial and later the real contagion with the 
dramatic decline of Brazilian exports) and the credit crunch for emerging markets.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In the last two decades, Brazil’s economic performance fell short of its potential. GDP growth 
averaged 1.5% a year between 1981 and 1990 and 2.7% in the following ten years, well below 
the more than 7% a year achieved in the previous 30 years. In the early 1990s, though, Brazil 
began to pursue a far-reaching agenda of market-friendly reforms, in an effort to regain the 
economy’s lost dynamism. The history of these reforms can be divided into three periods. In 
the first (1991-94), Brazil abandoned the import substitution regime by opening up the 
economy and privatizing industrial firms. The economy performed well, but inflation was not 
tamed. In 1995-98, the Cardoso government started privatizing the infrastructure sector and 
brought inflation down from 5000% a year to close to 2% in 1998. Delays in floating the 
exchange rate and lack of fiscal discipline led to mounting current account and fiscal deficits. 
In the third and final period, after 1999, a new macroeconomic policy framework was 
implemented based on fiscal discipline, inflation targets and a floating exchange rate.    
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The shocks – the energy shortage, Argentina’s crisis and the worst world recession 
since the 1970s – were a powerful blow to the economy’s fundamentals, particularly in face 
of indicators such as public-debt-to-GDP ratio and the current account deficit. Yet, as 
demonstrated by the 1999 currency crisis and its aftermath, the new policy regime seems 
equipped to deal with short term disturbances, particularly those caused by external shocks. 
Moreover, one has to look over the long term to assess the implications of extensive reforms 
such as those carried out during the 1990s. One could, for instance, draw a parallel between 
these reforms and those implemented in the mid-1960s, under the “Government Economic 
Action Plan” (PAEG, Plano de Ação Econômica do Governo). In both cases, there were long 
overdue policy and institutional changes that needed to be implemented. The 1960s reforms 
ended up paving the way for the so-called “Brazilian Miracle” (1968/73), a period of 
unparalleled rapid growth. Likewise, by dealing with bottlenecks inherited from decades of 
anti-trade bias and macroeconomic mismanagement, the 1990s reforms may pave the way for 
a new cycle of rapid growth.  
This outcome, however, will fundamentally hinge upon the ability and political will of 
the next administration (2003/06) to reaffirm the country’s commitment to free trade, to the 
new macroeconomic regime and to the institutional changes under way. This would require, 
first, a move to reinforce the institutional side of the new regime and second, an effort to 
pursue the so-called second generation of reforms, which are essential to boost investment, 
productivity and exports, three ingredients of a sustainable growth path.  
Although the economy has implemented major reforms, which paved the way for a 
sustainable recovery, results were slow to come in light of a number of policy missteps, 
particularly at the fiscal and exchange rate management, and a series of external shocks. This 
delay seems to have produced “reform fatigue” which has reduced political support for a 
second generation of reforms, which are key to complete and consolidate the achievements of 
the 1990s. If, despite fatigue, a pro-reform approach prevails in 2003 and afterwards, the 
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1990s might pass into history as laying the foundations of a long spell of prosperity.   
Even though the country seems to be a good position to withstand the current 
difficulties, it would be wrong to say that the nineties have exhausted Brazil’s growth agenda. 
At least two big challenges remain ahead. First, there is the need to consolidate the new 
macroeconomic policy regime. One can mention, for instance, the need to take the fiscal 
adjustment beyond temporary sources of revenue, such ad hoc taxes and the lack of an 
independent central bank, with a clear mandate to support the currency and fight inflation. 
Second, there are important microeconomic and institutional reforms, related to 
investment, productivity and exports, which are essential to any sustainable growth scenario. 
There has already been progress in some of these areas: the investment rate, which in the first 
half of the nineties remained below 15% (1980 prices), rose to 19% recently; total factor 
productivity, which had declined an average 2.4% per year in 1980-91, showed an annual 
increase of 1.7% in 1991-2000 (Bacha and Bonelli, 2001); and exports, as mentioned in 
section 2, after a lackluster performance throughout the decade, showed signs of recovery 
after the 1999 devaluation. Yet, the likelihood of consolidating or even building on these 
gains will be greatly enhanced if the structural and institutional reforms are deepened or 
extended towards areas such as the labor markets and the tax and judicial systems.   
 On productivity, whereas there is still a considerable agenda to push through in terms 
of trade liberalization, privatization and deregulation, it seems unlikely that these factors 
alone will be enough to keep productivity growing at the rates seen in 1990s. The major 
source of future gains seems to be on deregulating the labor market and on upgrading the 
skills of the labor force, an area were Brazil lags behind even by Latin American standards 
(Ranis and Stewart, 2001). The benefits of higher and more efficient investment in training 
and education are likely to be threefold: it might speed up the catching-up process; it would 
lay down the groundwork for a move towards more productive, technology-intensive sectors, 
with positive externalities for the whole economy; and it would reduce inequality, historically 
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the black spot of Brazil’s growth record. 
On export performance, the sustainability of the momentum gained after the 1999 
devaluation will depend heavily on the government’s ability to promote investments in 
infrastructure, to carry out a tax reform, to deepen the capital markets and to provide a better 
institutional support and improved market access for exporters. In the case of infrastructure, 
as mentioned earlier, considerable progress was made in the second half of the nineties 
through privatization of state enterprises. Yet, there is still a lot to be done, particularly in 
areas such as energy (as show by the severity of the recent crisis) and transport. Tax reform is 
an imperative given the characteristics of the present system, which penalizes producers with 
cumulative taxes. Financial deepening is a key pre-condition to bring small and medium firms 
into exporting and to allow firms to survive in sectors such as high-unit-value capital goods, 
where competitors count not only on more advanced capital markets, but also on state 
sponsored export credit agencies.15   
On the institutional front, government support to disseminate information can be a 
powerful tool to promote exports. There are already initiatives in this direction —for instance, 
the export promotion agency (APEX)— yet, compared to what has been done in East Asia, 
there is still a long road ahead. Finally, there is the issue of market access, where the current 
and the next government face crucial negotiations, particularly in agriculture and 
antidumping, involving Mercosur, the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas), the 
European Union and the WTO. 
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
GDP (US$ billion) /a 429.7 543.1 705.5 775.8 807.7 787.7 528.6 593.8 500.0 
GDP growth (%) 4.9 5.9 4.2 2.7 3.3 0.2 0.5 4.4 2.0 
  Industry (%) 7.0 6.7 1.9 3.3 4.7 -1.5 -1.6 5.0 1.5 
  Agriculture (%) -0.1 5.5 4.1 3.1 -0.8 1.9 7.4 3.0 3.5 
  Services (%) 4.5 1.8 1.3 2.3 2.6 1.1 1.5 3.7 2.0 
Inflation (IGP, january/december, %) 2708.6 1093.8 14.8 9.3 7.5 1.7 20.0 9.8 9.0 
GDP deflator (%) 1996.2 2240.2 77.6 17.4 8.3 4.7 4.4 8.5 8.1 
Real interest rate (%) /b 7.1 24.4 25.0 16.3 18.5 26.7 15.3 10.8 10.5 
Unemployment - IBGE (%) 5.3 5.1 4.6 5.4 5.7 7.6 7.6 7.1 6.5 
Current account deficit (% GDP) 0.1 0.2 2.5 3.0 3.8 4.3 4.7 4.1 4.7 
National accounts (% GDP, current prices) 
Final consumption 77.7 77.5 79.5 81.0 80.9 80.9 80.6 79.2 na 
   Private 60.0 59.6 59.9 62.5 62.7 62.1 61.7 60.4 na 
   Government 17.7 17.9 19.6 18.5 18.2 18.8 18.9 18.8 na 
Gross capital formation 20.9 22.2 22.3 20.9 21.5 21.2 20.5 23.0 na 
   Investment 19.3 20.8 20.5 19.3 19.9 19.7 na na na 
   Change of inventories 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 na na na 
Goods and non-factors services 1.4 0.3 -1.8 -1.9 -2.4 -2.1 -1.1 -2.2 na 
   Exports 10.5 9.5 7.7 7.0 7.5 7.6 10.6 9.9 na 
   Imports 9.1 9.2 9.5 8.9 9.9 9.7 11.7 12.1 na 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 na 
Tax burden, National Accounts (% GDP) 25.3 27.9 28.4 28.6 28.6 29.3 31.7 32.0 32.5 
na :  Not available 
/a GDP divided by the average exchange rate (R$/US$). 
/b Gross rate (SELIC). Deflator: "Centered IGP". Since 1995, CPI.
Sources: IBGE, IPEA and FGV. For 2001, authors' forecast, based on the results of half of the year.  
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